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Connecting Consumers: Common Framework for Networked Personal Health Information

CT2: Authentication of Consumers

Common Framework for Networked Personal Health Information

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CT2: Authentication of Consumers
(Page 8 of 8)
This practice area addresses the following Connecting for Health Core Principles for a Networked Environment*:
6. Data Quality and integrity
7. Security safeguards and controls
* "The Architecture for Privacy in a Networked Health Information Environment," Connecting for Health, June 2006. Available at: http://www.connectingforhealth.org/commonframework/docs/P1_CFH_Architecture.pdf.

Appendix F: Two Models of Remote Authentication

There are at least two possible architectural solutions to the question of allowing a Health Data Source to accept a Consumer Access Services' request for copies of a consumer's health data. First, the Health Data Source could re-authenticate the consumer. Collectively, we will call this repeated authentication process a two-phase authentication (not to be confused with two-factor authentication). Second, in lieu of re-authenticating the consumer, the remote data source could accept an identity assertion from the Consumer Access Service. Collectively, we will call this scenario authentication plus assertion. The diagram, text, and table below will elaborate on the differences between these two processes.

In authentication plus assertion (right hand model), the consumer only authenticates to the Consumer Access Service, which then transmits an assertion to the remote source indicating that the consumer is requesting data. In addition to this assertion, the Consumer Access Service passes along its own organizational credentials. The Consumer Access Service authenticates the consumer, but asserts to the remote data source that it is acting on the consumer's behalf by presenting the demographic information necessary to match the consumer to data held by the remote data source. Therefore, authentication plus assertion assumes that a data owner trusts another entity (i.e., the local application) to authenticate the consumer.

In two-phase authentication (left hand model), the consumer has two separate sets of authentication credentials and procedures. Both the Consumer Access Service and the remote data source maintain separate authentication information on the consumer. Each has gone through a process that initially proofs the consumer's identity, and each has an associated method for authenticating the consumer on an ongoing basis. The role of the Consumer Access Service is to both locally authenticate the consumer and to transmit the consumer's information that is required by the remote data source to perform its authentication process. In this second step, the Consumer Access Service acts only as a proxy.

Let's consider an example that illustrates two-phase authentication. Programs such as Quicken allow users to download data from remote sources (banks, brokerage firms, etc.) into the local application. When a user wishes to download data from her bank into her Quicken application, she must first authenticate locally (i.e., log into the Quicken software). Then, when she requests a data download, Quicken sends the login-name/password combination that corresponds to her bank's online banking service. (For convenience, the user has already stored her login-name and password within Quicken.) Thus, Quicken acts as the user's proxy during the remote data source authentication process. In the case that the local application is a web-based service, such as the Consumer Access Service, the local application can use mechanisms such as SAML to transmit the user's credentials.

This two-phase authentication model puts the burden of authentication on the consumer and the data sources. The individual must log in to multiple data sources before accessing data through the Consumer Access Service. Data gathering and authentication choices are handled by proximate data sources. Consumer access authentication choices are handled by the Consumer Access Service. This model is the safe deposit model – the consumer's authentication with the Consumer Access Service is unrelated to her authentication with the proximate data sources. There is also nothing specific to health care governing the collection of usernames and logins for remote services, increasing the risk.

However, having established that the consumer has authenticated both at the Consumer Access Service and at a data source, the Consumer Access Service and a data source could set up a business relationship such that all subsequent logins would be treated as the same person. This would make it possible to rely on the clinical data source's proofing mechanism, but the Consumer Access Service's authentication method. The weak link in this system is the Consumer Access Service authentication mechanism. The Consumer Access Service and the clinical data source would have to agree on the stringency of the Consumer Access Service authentication requirements, and have mechanisms for audit and redress.

In authentication plus assertion, the consumer only authenticates to the Consumer Access Service, which then transmits an assertion to the remote source indicating that the consumer is requesting data. In addition to this assertion, the Consumer Access Service passes along its own organizational credentials. The Consumer Access Service authenticates the consumer, but asserts to the remote data source that it is acting on the consumer's behalf by presenting the demographic information necessary to match the consumer to data held by the remote data source. Therefore, authentication plus assertion assumes that a data owner trusts another entity (i.e., the local application) to authenticate the consumer.

The table below compares these two processes based on a list of issues:

Issue Two-phase Authentication Authentication plus Assertion
Ease of use for consumer   Advantage
Technical work for implementing authentication   Advantage
Number of proofing/token problems per remote access 2 1
Susceptibility to man-in-the-middle attacks   Advantage against browser hacks (but open to attacks between Consumer Access Service/data sources)
Susceptibility to error/abuse by human authorizer Advantage  
Legal risk for remote data source Advantage  
Scales well for establishing relationships from data source to Consumer Access Service Advantage  
Cost to Consumer Access Service to implement Low High
Cost to individual data sources High Low

Authentication plus assertion requires data owners to be willing to delegate authentication to another entity. Unless a data source has developed appropriate legal agreements that cover mistakes made by delegates (e.g., releases of data to the wrong person), the data owner (and its insurance carrier) may be unwilling to delegate its authentication process to others.

Authentication plus assertion does not scale well from the standpoint of industry since every local application must have agreements with all remote data sources. As the number of local applications and remote data sources increases, the total number of agreements rises exponentially. Therefore, this model is only practical if one of the following conditions is true:

  1. There are a limited number of both data sources and local applications or intermediaries (i.e., if there were only a handful of Consumer Access Service providers.)
  2. There are a limited number of data sources.
  3. There are a limited number of local applications or intermediaries.

It is not the purpose of our Work Group to endorse one model over another. We believe it important to note that both models will likely be offered in the marketplace for some time to come.

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